Ascending k-Bundle Auction (AkBA)

AkBA is a combinatorial auction, a class of mechanisms that permit bidders to make offers on bundles of objects. Combinatorial auctions have been attracting a great deal of attention from researchers lately. AkBA is really a family of auctions. The family member in which the parameter k =1 is what we have studied most. The auction has three important properties:

Progressive: The basic rules require that a bidder improve her bid over both her previous bid, and the prices announced by the auction. This ensures that the auction proceeds toward a terminal state.

Anonymous, bundle prices: The auction announces prices on the bundles, which guides the bidders by telling them what they are winning and how much they would have to pay to win a different bundle. Moreover, the same prices are announced to all of bidders (i.e. price information is anonymous).

Equilibrium prices: The unique feature of AkBA is that it computes equilibrium bundle-prices. By this we mean that at the announced prices, no participant would prefer to switch to another bundle (insofar as we can determine from their bid information).

For more information about this auction, see our recent EC'00 paper.