Text and Schedule

Herbert Gintis, Game Theory Evolving, Princeton University Press, 2000, $38.24 (Amazon).

Date	Chapter in Gintis	Topic
Aug. 23 - 25	1, 2	Backward induction
Aug. 28 - Sept. 1	2	Backward induction
Sept. 6 - Sept. 8	2	Eliminating dominated strategies
Sept. 11 - 15	2, 1, 3	Eliminating dominated strategies, pure strategy Nash equilibria
Sept. 18 - 22	3	Pure strategy Nash equilibria, games with incomplete information
Sept. 25	3	Games with incomplete information
Sept. 27		Review
Sept. 29		Test on Chapters 1 - 3
Oct. 2 - 6	4	Mixed strategy Nash equilibria
Oct. 9 - 11	4	Mixed strategy Nash equilibria
Oct. 16 - 20	5	Commitments, threats, subgame perfect equilibria
Oct. 23 - 27	6	Repeated games
Oct. 30 - Nov. 3	7	Symmetric games, evolutionary stability
Nov. 6 - Nov. 10	7, 8	Evolutionary stability, dynamical systems
Nov. 13	8	Dynamical systems
Nov. 15		Review
Nov. 17		Test on Chapters 4 - 7
Nov. 20	8	Dynamical systems
Nov. 27--31	9	Evolutionary dynamics
Dec. 4 - Dec. 8	11	Trust, reciprocity, and altruism

The final exam is Monday, Dec. 11, 1:00 - 4:00 p.m., in the usual room.