Ronald Endicott, "Nomic-Role Nonreductionism: Identifying Properties by Total Nomic Roles," forthcoming in Philosophical Topics 35 (2007/8, no.2 [pdf]. I introduce "nomic-role nonreductionism" as an alternative to causal-role functionalism in the philosophy of mind. It is inspired by recent trends in cognitive science that emphasize embodied cognition and multi-level methods of explanation. While causal-role functionalists identify mental properties by an intra-level transition theory that describes relations between inputs, internal mental states, and outputs, I suggest that one identify mental properties by a more comprehensive theory that includes inter-level facts about realization from the appropriate implementation sciences. I also present a general account of property identity that is suggested by this appeal to a larger network of nomic relations.

Ronald Endicott, "Reinforcing the Three ‘R’s: Reduction, Reception, and Replacement," in M. Schouten and H. Looren de Jong, eds., The Matter of the Mind: Philosophical Essays on Psychology, Neuroscience, and Reduction. UK: Blackwell, 2007, 146-171. [pdf] I offer a more or less friendly amendment to Kenneth Schaffner’s “General Reduction-Replacement” model of scientific unification, a model that has also been utilized by Paul Churchland, Clifford Hooker, and John Bickle in their “New Wave” approach to reduction. Both Schaffner and the New Wave interpret scientific unification broadly in terms of a continuum from theory reduction to theory replacement. But they leave no place on the continuum for type irreducible and irreplaceable theories. Yet I believe a more general account of scientific unification should include them in a process of partial reduction, specifically, a reduction of their tokens. Thus I propose a “Reduction-Reception-Replacement” model wherein type irreducible and irreplaceable theories are received for the purpose of unifying domains of particulars. I also suggest a link between this kind of token reduction and mechanistic explanation.

Ronald Endicott, "Multiple Realizability," in D. Borchert, ed., The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol. 6, 2nd edition. US: Thomson Gale, Macmillan Reference, 2005, pp.427-432. [pdf] I explain and discuss two notions implied by the concept of multiple realizability -- "multiplicity," otherwise known as property variability, and "realizability," which is a specific relation that exists in paradigm cases of property varibility. Beginning with the latter, I distinguish three broad traditions of realization: “mathematical,” “logico-semantic,” and “metaphysical.” I also discuss issues that arise with each tradition. I then turn to the subject of property variability, define it in a formal way, and briefly discuss various debates over identity and reduction where the notion of property variability has played a central role.

Ronald Endicott,"Post-Structuralist Angst, Critical Notice: John Bickle, Psychoneural Reduction: The New Wave," Philosophy of Science 68, no.3 (2001): 377-393. [pdf] I critically evaluate John Bickle’s version of the "new wave" account of scientific theory reduction, which is a modified structuralist gloss on Paul Churchland and Clifford Hooker’s more general new wave view. I press three main points. First, Bickle’s modification seems to lose what was distinctive about the Churchland-Hooker account, so that it becomes a modified structuralist gloss on Kenneth Schaffner’s older nonwavish approximate reduction. Second, a familiar problem for classical reductionism resurfaces within this newest wave of thinking, namely, the issue of property identities and inter-theoretic bridge laws implied by the new wave account, a problem that is exacerbated by Bickle’s conciliatory treatment of property plasticity and the intertheoretic cross classification of terms. Third, Bickle’s interesting response to cross classification via Hooker’s function-to-structure token reduction is actually a guised form of eliminative materialism.

Ronald Endicott,"Collapse of the New Wave," Journal of Philosophy 95, no.2 (1998): 53-72. [pdf] I discuss and critically evaluate the general new wave account of theory reduction in science developed by Paul Churchland, Clifford Hooker, and John Bickle. First, I cast doubt on claims that the new wave model enjoys a number of theoretical virtues over its competitors. Second, I argue that the new wave model has but one genuinely novel element, and it should be rejected. Third, I show that once its ontological consequences are duly noted, the reductive part the new wave model collapses into the classical theory developed within the logical empiricist tradition, so that it still falls prey to standard anti-reductionist argument based upon multiple realizability and the cross-classification of special science and physical science terms.