Mind Matrix

This matrix does not contain all of even the bare essentials for the discussion of theories of mind, but it may nevertheless be helpful in studying the material.

Theory Mind-Body Connection Clear Basis for Explaining Behavior? Knowledge of Other Minds Easy Enough? Reasons in Favor Reasons Against

Cartesian Dualism No - mind-body causation appears impossible. No, other minds are undetectable.
Yields simple, straightforward, systematic semantics for "opposites" sentences

Descartes's Argument for Distinctness of Mind and Body

No Interaction Argument

Problem of Other Minds

Behaviorism Yes - mental states are bodily dispositions Yes, behavioral dispositions are observable
Avoids dualism's problems

Yields clear instructions for design of psychological experiments.
Unthinking Waldo Simulator - a decisive counterexample

Machine Functionalism Yes - minds are machines running software Yes - observation of external and internal behavior in principle possible Avoids behaviorism's problem of pattern poverty; incorporates dualism's insight that no particular material medium is necessary for mental activity.
Block's Absent Quality Objection

An Argument against Machine Functionalism, On Purpose

The following three theories were offered as responses to An Argument against Machine Functionalism, On Purpose

Theological Functionalism Yes, human minds are machines running divine software Yes - observation of external and internal human behavior in principle possible Evades An Argument against Machine Functionalism, On Purpose Either fails to answer question of where interpretations come from , or renders religious discourse unintelligible

Evolutionary Functionalism Yes, minds are biological machines running software that has evolved along with the 'wetware'. Yes - observation of external and internal behavior in principle possible and evolution of behavior explicable Avoids problems of Theological Functionalism while retaining design metaphor Swampperson Objection raises serious question about necessity of evolutionary history

Purpose-Directed Functionalism Perhaps - no non-physical substance required for mental activity Perhaps - if conditions for application of irreducible notion of "purpose" are clear enough. Preserves insights of dualism while avoiding the problems of behaviorism and other forms of functionalism Must answer question, How does one determine which physical systems must be described with relevant notion of purpose?

2001 David F. Austin

Back to: Sample Hour Exam #3 with answers

Theory	Mind-Body Connection Clear Basis for Explaining Behavior?	Knowledge of Other Minds Easy Enough?	Reasons in Favor	Reasons Against
Cartesian Dualism	No - mind-body causation appears impossible.	No, other minds are undetectable.	Yields simple, straightforward, systematic semantics for "opposites" sentences Descartes's Argument for Distinctness of Mind and Body	No Interaction Argument Problem of Other Minds
Behaviorism	Yes - mental states are bodily dispositions	Yes, behavioral dispositions are observable	Avoids dualism's problems Yields clear instructions for design of psychological experiments.	Unthinking Waldo Simulator - a decisive counterexample
Machine Functionalism	Yes - minds are machines running software	Yes - observation of external and internal behavior in principle possible	Avoids behaviorism's problem of pattern poverty; incorporates dualism's insight that no particular material medium is necessary for mental activity.	Block's Absent Quality Objection An Argument against Machine Functionalism, On Purpose
The following three theories were offered as responses to An Argument against Machine Functionalism, On Purpose
Theological Functionalism	Yes, human minds are machines running divine software	Yes - observation of external and internal human behavior in principle possible	Evades An Argument against Machine Functionalism, On Purpose	Either fails to answer question of where interpretations come from , or renders religious discourse unintelligible
Evolutionary Functionalism	Yes, minds are biological machines running software that has evolved along with the 'wetware'.	Yes - observation of external and internal behavior in principle possible and evolution of behavior explicable	Avoids problems of Theological Functionalism while retaining design metaphor	Swampperson Objection raises serious question about necessity of evolutionary history
Purpose-Directed Functionalism	Perhaps - no non-physical substance required for mental activity	Perhaps - if conditions for application of irreducible notion of "purpose" are clear enough.	Preserves insights of dualism while avoiding the problems of behaviorism and other forms of functionalism	Must answer question, How does one determine which physical systems must be described with relevant notion of purpose?